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ABSTRACT
Recently, many adversarial examples have emerged for Deep
Neural Networks (DNNs) causing misclassifications. However, in-
depth work still needs to be performed to demonstrate such attacks
and security vulnerabilities for spiking neural networks (SNNs),
i.e. the 3rd generation NNs. This paper aims at addressing the
fundamental questions:"Are SNNs vulnerable to the adversarial
attacks as well?" and "if yes, to what extent?" Using a Spiking Deep
Belief Network (SDBN) for the MNIST database classification, we
show that the SNN accuracy decreases accordingly to the noise
magnitude in data poisoning random attacks applied to the test
images. Moreover, SDBNs generalization capabilities increase by
applying noise to the training images. We develop a novel black box
attack methodology to automatically generate imperceptible and
robust adversarial examples through a greedy algorithm, which is
first of its kind for SNNs.
1 INTRODUCTION
Spiking Neural Networks (SNNs) are the third generation of neu-
ral network models [4], and are rapidly emerging as a better design
option compared to DNNs, due to their inherent model structure
and properties matching the closest to today’s understanding of a
brain’s functionality. As a result, SNNs result in:
• ComputationallymorePowerful than several otherNN
Models: a lower number of neurons is required to realize
the same computations.
• High Energy Efficiency: spiking neurons process the in-
formation only when a new spike arrives, so they have lower
energy consumption because the spike events are sparse in
time [6].
• Biologically Plausible: spiking neurons are very similar
to the biological ones because they use discrete spikes to
compute and transmit information. For this reason, SNNs
are also highly sensitive to the temporal characteristics of
processed data [3] [5].
SNNs have primarily been used for tasks like real-data classifi-
cation, biomedical applications, odor recognition, navigation and
analysis of an environment, speech and image recognition [1] [2].
One of the most used dataset for image classification is the MNIST
database (Modified National Institute of Standards and Technol-
ogy database) [16]. Recently, the work of [31] proposed to convert
every pixel of the images into spike trains (i.e., the sequences of
spikes) according to its intensity. However, even a small adversarial
perturbation of the input images can increase the probability of the
SNN misprediction (i.e., the image is classified incorrectly).
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Figure 1: Overview of our approach.
In recent years, manymethods to generate adversarial attacks for
DNNs and their respective defense techniques have been proposed
[7] [18] [21] [22] [23] [27] [28] [29]. Every classification task has
to face several challenges to resist to the attacks. A minimal and
imperceptible modification of the input data can cause a classifier
misprediction, which can potentially produce a wrong output with
high probability. This scenario has the potential to infer serious
consequences in safety-critical applications (e.g., automotive, med-
ical, privacy and banking) where even a single misclassification
can have fatal consequences. For instance, in the image recognition
field, having a wide variety of possible real world input images [22],
with high-complex pixel intensity patterns, the classifier cannot
recognize if the source of the misclassification is the attacker or
other factors [20]. Given an input image x , the goal of an adversarial
attack x∗ = x + δ is to apply a small perturbation δ such that the
predicted class C(x) is different from the target one C(x∗), i.e., the
class in which the attacker wants to classify the example. Inputs
can also be misclassified without specifying the target class: this is
the case of untargeted attacks, where the target class is not defined
a-priori by the intruder. Targeted attacks can be more difficult to
apply than the untargeted ones, but they are more efficient. An-
other important classification of adversarial attacks is based on the
knowledge of the network under attack [24], as discussed below:
• White box attack: the intruder has complete access and
knowledge of the architecture, the network parameters, the
training data and the existence of a possible defense.
• Black box attack: the intruder does not know the archi-
tecture, the network parameters, the training data and a
possible defense, but it can only interact with the network
(which is treated as a black box) and the testing data. [25]
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Deep Belief Networks (DBNs) are multi-layer networks that
are widely used for classification problems and implemented in
many areas such as visual processing, audio processing, images
and text recognition with optimal results [15]. DBNs are imple-
mented by stacking pre-trained Restricted Boltzmann Machines
(RBMs), energy-based models consisting in two layers of neurons,
one hidden and one visible, fully and symmetrically connected.
RBMs are typically trained with unsupervised learning, to extract
the information saved in the hidden units, and then a supervised
training is performed to train a classifier based on these features
[32]. Spiking DBNs (SDBNs) improve the energy efficiency and com-
putation speed, as compared to DBNs. Such behavior has already
been observed by [8].
In this paper, we aim at generating, for the first time, impercep-
tible and robust adversarial examples for SNNs. For the evaluation,
we apply these attacks to a SDBN and a DNN having the same
number of layers and neurons, to obtain a fair comparison. As per
our knowledge, this kind of attack was previously applied only on
a DNN model [26]. This method is efficient for DNNs because it is
able to generate adversarial examples which are imperceptible to
the human eye, as compared to the original image. Moreover, in
the physical world, the attack efficacy can significantly decrease if
the pre-processing transformations such as compression, resizing,
noise filtering are applied to the input images [9] [26]. In this paper,
we investigate the vulnerability of SDBNs to random noise and
adversarial attacks, aiming at identifying the similarities and the
differences with respect to DNNs. Our experiments show that, when
applying a random noise to a given SDBN, its classification accuracy
decreases, by increasing the noise magnitude. Moreover, applying
our attack to SDBNs, we observe that, in contrast as the case of
DNNs, the output probabilities follow a different behavior: while
the adversarial image remains imperceptible, the misclassification
is not always guaranteed.
Our Novel Contributions:
(1) We analyze how the SDBN accuracy varies when a random
noise is added to the input images (Sections 3.2 and 3.3).
(2) We evaluate the improved generalization capabilities of the
SDBN when adding a random noise to the training images
(Section 3.3).
(3) We develop a new methodology to automatically create ad-
versarial examples. It isthe first attack of this type applied to
SDBNs (Section 4)
(4) We apply our methodology to a DNN and an SDBN, and
evaluate its imperceptibility and robustness (Section 5).
(5) Open-Source Contributions: We will release the complete
code of the adversarial example generator online at this link:
http://LinkHiddenForBlindReview.
Before proceeding to the technical sections, in the Section 2 we
briefly review some works related to our paper, focusing on SDBNs
and adversarial attacks for DNNs.
2 RELATEDWORK
2.1 Spiking Deep Belief Networks
A DBN [15] is a stacked sequence of RBMs. Each RBM is com-
posed by two layers of hidden and visible units, fully connected, i.e.,
without connections between the neurons inside the same layer
(this is the main difference with respect to the standard Boltzmann
machines). O’Connor et al. [8] proposed a DBN model composed
by 4 RBMs of 784-500-500-10 neurons, respectively. It has been
trained offline and transformed in an event-based domain to in-
crease the processing efficiency and computational power. The
RBMs are trained with the Persistent Contrastive Divergence (CD)
algorithm, an unsupervised learning rule using Gibbs sampling, a
Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm, with optimizations for fast
weights, selectivity and sparsity [12] [13] [14]. Once every RBM
is trained, the information is stored in the hidden units to use it
as input for the visible units of the following layer. Afterwards, a
supervised learning algorithm [11], based on the features coming
from the unsupervised training, is performed. The RBMs of this
model use the Siegert function [19] in their neurons. It allows to
have a good approximation of firing rate of Leaky Integrate and
Fire (LIF) neurons [3], used for CD training. So in a SDBN the neu-
rons generate Poisson spike trains according to the Siegert formula:
this represents a great advantage in terms of power consumption
and speed, as compared to classical DBNs, which are based on a
discrete-time model [8].
2.2 Adversarial Attacks for DNNs
As demonstrated for the first time by Szegedy et al. [30], adver-
sarial attacks can misclassify an image changing its pixels with
small perturbations. Kukarin et al. [22] define adversarial examples
as a sample of input data which has been modified very slightly in
a way that is intended to cause a machine learning classifier to mis-
classify it. Luo et al. [26] propose a new method to generate attacks
maximazing their noise tolerance and taking into account the hu-
man perceptual system in their distance metric. This methodology
has strongly inspired our algorithm. Since the human eyes are more
sensitive to the modifications of the pixels in low variance areas, to
maintain as much as possible the imperceptibility it is preferable
to modify the pixels in high variance areas. From the other side, a
robust attack aims to increase its ability to stay misclassified to the
target class after the transformations due to the physical world. For
example, considering a crafted sample, after an image compression
or a resizing, its output probabilities can change according to the
types of applied transformations. Therefore, the attack can be in-
effective if it is not robust enough to those variations. Motivated
by these considerations, we propose an algorithm to automatically
generate imperceptible and robust adversarial examples.
3 ANALYSIS: APPLYING RANDOM NOISE TO
SDBNS
3.1 Experiment Setup
We take as a case-study example an SDBN composed by four
fully-connected layers of 784-500-500-10 neurons, respectively. We
implement this SDBN in Matlab [17], for analyzing the MNIST
database, a collection of 28·28 gray scale images of handwritten
digits, divided into 60.000 training images and 10.000 test images.
Each pixel is encoded as a value between 0 and 255, according to
its intensity. To maximize the spike firing, the input data are scaled
to the range [0-0.2], before converting them into spikes.
3.2 Understanding the Impact of Random
Noise Addition to Inputs on the Accuracy
of an SDBN
We test the accuracy of our SDBN for different noise magnitudes,
applied to three different combinations of images:
• to all the training images.
• to all the test images.
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ACC TRAIN TEST TR+TST TRAIN TEST TR+TST
δ NORMALLY UNIFORMLY
0.02 96.65 94.73 96.54 96.8 96.02 96.81
0.05 95.19 94.42 94.99 96.7 95.64 96.72
0.08 92.99 82.73 73.64 95.89 94.64 95.56
0.1 76.01 77.07 10.39 94.34 93.36 92.8
0.15 24.61 48.23 10.32 47.03 82.76 10.51
0.2 10.26 33.34 10.05 14.64 60.79 10.16
0.3 10.31 21.52 9.88 9.59 34.9 10.16
0.4 10.27 17.05 10.34 9.98 23.16 10.03
Table 1: Evaluation of SDBN accuracy applying two different types
of random noise with different values of noise magnitude.
• to both the training and test images.
In order to test the vulnerability of our SDBN, we apply two
different types of noises: normally distributed and uniformly dis-
tributed random noise.
The results of the experiments are shown in Table 1. The starting
accuracy, obtained without applying noise, is 96.2%. When the
noise is applied to the test images, as shown in Figure 2a, the
accuracy of the SDBN decreases accordingly with the increasing
of the noise magnitude, more evidently in the case of normally
distributed random noise. This behavior is due to the fact that
the standard normal distribution contains a wider range of values,
compared to the uniform one. For both noise distributions, the
accuracy decreases more when the noise magnitude applied lays
around 0.15 (see the red-colored values in Table 1).
When the noise is applied to the train images, as represented
in Figure 2b the accuracy of the SDBN does not decrease as much
as in the previous case, as long as the noise magnitude is lower
than 0.1. On the contrary, for δ = 0.02, the accuracy increases (see
the green-colored values in Table 1). with respect to the baseline,
without noise. Indeed, adding noise in training samples improves
the generalization capabilities of the neural network. Hence, its
capability to correctly classify new unseen samples also increases.
This observation, already analyzed in several other scenarios for
Deep Neural Networks with back-propagation training [10], is
also valid for our SDBN model. However, if the noise is equal to
or greater than 0.1, the accuracy drops significantly: this behavior
means that the SDBN is learning noise instead of useful information,
thus it is not able to classify.
When the noise is applied to both the training and test images,
as shown in Figure 2c, we can notice that the behavior observed for
the case of noise applied to the train images only is accentuated:
for low values of noise magnitude (mostly in the uniform noise
case) the accuracy is similar or higher than the baseline; for noise
magnitudes greater than 0.1 (more precisely, 0.08 for the case of
normal noise applied), the accuracy decreases more sharply than
in the case of noise applied to the train images only.
3.3 Applying Noise to a Restricted Window of
Pixels
Further analyses have been performed: we add a normally dis-
tributed random noise to a restricted window of pixels of the test
images. Considering a rectangle of 4x5 pixels, we analyze two sce-
narios:
• The noise is applied to 20 pixels at the top-left corner of
the image. The variation of the accuracy is represented by
the blue-colored line of Figure 3. As expected, the accuracy
remains almost constant, because the noise affects irrelevant
(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 2: Normal and uniform randomnoise applied to all the pixels
of the MNIST dataset. (a) To the test images only. (b) To the train
images only. (c) To both the train and test images.
Figure 3: Normal randomnoise applied to some pixels of theMNIST
dataset test images.
pixels. The resulting image, when the noise is equal to 0.3,
is shown in Figure 4b.
• The noise is applied to 20 pixels in the middle of the image,
with coordinates (x ,y) = ([14 17], [10 14]). The accuracy
descreases more significantly (orange-colored line of Figure
3), as compaerd to the previous case, because some white
pixels representing the handwritten digits (and therefore
important for the classification) are affected by the noise.
The resulting image, when the noise is equal to 0.3, is shown
in Figure 4c.
3.4 Key Observations from our Analyses
From the analyses performed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, we derive
the following key observations:
• The normal noise is more powerful than the uniform coun-
terpart, since the accuracy decreases more sharply.
• For a low noise magnitude applied to the train images, we
notice a small accuracy improvement, due to the improved
generalization capability of SDBNs.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4: Comparison between images with normally distributed
random noise (with magnitude 0.3) applied to the corner and to the
left center of the image. (a) Without noise. (b) Noise applied to the
top-left corner. (c) Noise applied to the center of the image.
• When applying the noise to a restricted window of pixels, the
perturbation is more effective if the window is in the center
of the image, as compared to the corner, because the noise is
applied to the pixels which are relevant for the classification.
4 OUR NOVEL METHODOLOGY TO
GENERATE IMPERCEPTIBLE AND ROBUST
ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
The scope of a good attack is to generate adversarial images, which
are difficult to be detected by human eyes and resistant to physical
transformations. Therefore, for better understanding this challenge,
we first analyze two concepts: imperceptibility and robustness.
4.1 Imperceptibility of adversarial examples
Creating an imperceptible example means to add perturbations
to some pixels, while being aware to make sure that humans do
not notice them. We consider an area A=N·N of pixels x , and we
compute the standard deviation (SD) of a pixel xi as in Equation (1):
SD(xi ) =
√√ ∑
xk ∈J
(xk − µ)2
A
, (1)
where µ is the average value of pixels belonging to the N·N area,
J represents the set of pixels forming the area into consideration
and k is the index relative to all these pixels of the area except from
xi itself. If a pixel has a high standard deviation, it means that a
perturbation added to this pixel is more likely to be hardly detected
by the human eye, compared to a pixel with low standard deviation.
The sum of all the perturbations δ added to the pixels of the area A
allows to compute the distance (D) between the adversarial example
X ∗ and the original one X . Its formula is shown in Equation (2).
D(X ∗,X ) =
A∑
i=1
δi
SD(xi ) (2)
Such value can be used to monitor the imperceptibility: indeed,
the distance D indicates how much perturbation is added to the
pixels in the area A. Hence, the maximum perturbation tolerated by
the human eye can be associated to a certain value of the distance,
Dmax .
4.2 Robustness of adversarial examples
Another important concept to analyze is the robustness. Many
adversarial attack methods used to maximize the probability of
target class to ease the classifier misclassification of the image. The
main problem of this methods is that they do not take in account
the relative difference between the class probabilities, i.e., the gap,
defined in Equation (3).
Gap(X ∗) = P(tarдetclass) −max{P(otherclasses)} (3)
Therefore, after an image transformation, a minimal modifica-
tion of the probabilities can make the attack ineffective. In order to
improve the robustness, it is desirable to increase the difference be-
tween the probability of the target class and the highest probability
of the other classes. In other words, to maximize the gap function.
4.3 How to automatically generate attacks
Considering these important parameters, we designed a novel
greedy algorithm that automatically generates adversarial examples
imperceptible and robust. This algorithm is based on the black-
box assumption: the attacks are performed on some pixels of the
image, therebywithout needing to know the insights of the network.
Given the maximum allowed distance Dmax such that human eyes
cannot detect perturbations, the problem can be expressed as in
Equation (4).
argmax
X ∗
Gap(X ∗) | D(X ∗,X ) ≤ Dmax (4)
In summary, the purpose of our iterative algorithm is to perturb a
set of pixels, to maximize the gap function, thus making the attack
robust, while keeping the distance between the samples below the
desired threshold, in order to remain imperceptible.
Our iterative algorithm perturbs only a window of pixels of the
total image. We choose a certain value N, which corresponds to an
area of N·N pixels, performing the attack on a subset M of pixels.
Our proposed methodology to automatically generate adversarial
examples is shown in Algorithm 1. After having computed the
standard deviation for the selected N·N pixels, we compute the gap
function, i.e., the difference between the probability of the target
class and the highest probability between the other classes. Then,
the algorithm decides whether to apply a positive or negative noise
to the pixels. Therefore, we compute two parameters for each pixel,
Gap+(X ∗) andGap−(X ∗).Gap+(X ∗) is the value of the gap function
computed by adding a perturbation unit to the single pixel, while
Gap−(X ∗) is the counterpart, computed subtracting a perturbation
unit. According to the difference between these values and the gap
function, and considering also the standard deviation, we compute
the variation priority, a function that indicates the effectiveness
of the pixel perturbation. For example, if Gap−(X ∗) is greater than
Gap+(X ∗), it means that, for that pixel, subtracting the noise will
be more effective than adding it to the pixel, since the difference
between P(tarдet class) and max[P(other classes)] will increase
more. Once computed the vector VariationPriority, its values are
ordered and the highest M values are perturbed. Note: according
to the previous considerations, the noise is added to or subtracted
from the selected M pixels, depending on the highest value between
Gap+(X ∗) and Gap−(X ∗). The algorithm starts the next iteration
by replacing the original input image with the created adversarial
one. The iterations terminate when the distance between original
and adversarial examples overcomes the maximum perceptual dis-
tance. Figure 5 summarizes our algorithm for generating adversarial
examples.
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Algorithm 1: Our Methodology
Given: original sample X, maximum human perceptual distance
Dmax , noise magnitude δ , area of A pixels, target class, M
while D(X ,X ∗) < Dmax do
-Compute Standard Deviation SD for every pixel of A
-Compute Gap(X ∗), Gap−(X ∗), Gap+(X ∗)
if Gap(X ∗)− > Gap(X ∗)+ then
VariationPriority(xi )=[Gap−(X ∗) −Gap(X ∗)] ∗ SD(xi )
else
VariationPriority(xi )=[Gap+(X ∗) −Gap(X ∗)] ∗ SD(xi )
end if
-Sort in descending order VariationPriority
-Select M pixels with highest VariationPriority
if Gap(X ∗)− > Gap(X ∗)+ then
Subtract noise with magnitude δ from the pixel
else
Add noise with magnitude δ to the pixel
end if
-Compute D(X ,X ∗)
-Update the original example with the adversarial one
end while
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Figure 5: Our methodology for generating adversarial examples.
5 EVALUATING OUR ATTACK ON SDBNS
AND DNNS
5.1 Setup
By using our methodology, described in Section 4.3, we attack
two different networks: the same SDBN as the one analyzed in
Section 3 and a DNN, both implemented in Matlab. Note, to achieve
a fair comparison, we design the DNN for our experiments having
the same architecture as the SDBN, i.e., composed by four fully-
connected layers of 784-500-500-10 neurons, respectively. The DNN
is trained with scaled conjugate gradient backpropagation algo-
rithm and its classification accuracy of MNIST dataset is 97.13%. In
order to test our methodology, we select a test sample, labeled as
five (see Figure 6). It is classified correctly by both networks, but
with different output probabilities. We use a value of δ equal to the
10% of the pixel scale range and a Dmax equal to 22 to compare the
attacks. We distinguish two cases, having different search window
sizes:
(I) Figure 6a: N=5 and M=10. Motivated by the experiments
performed in Section 3, we define the search window in a
central area of the image, as shown by the red square of 6a.
(a) (b)
Figure 6: Selected area of pixels to attack
(II) Figure 6b: N=7 and M=10. It can be interesting to observe
the difference with respect to the case I: in this situation we
perturb the same amount M of pixels, selected from a search
window which contains 24 more pixels.
5.2 DNN Under Attack
The baseline DNN classifies our test sample as a five with its
associated probability equal to 98.79%, as shown in Figure 7a. The
selected target class is three for both the cases. The classification
results of their respective adversarial images are showed in Figure
7b for the case I and in Figure 7c for the case II. We can make the
following remarks:
(I) After 14 iterations, the probability of the target class has
overcome the one of the initial class. Indeed, the sample is
classified as a three with a probability equal to 55.74%, while
the probability associated to the five is dropped to 44.16%.
The Figure 8a shows the sample at this stage (denoted as
intermediate in Figure 7b). The distance D(X ∗) is equal to
20.19. At the following iteration, the gap between the two
classes increases, thus increasing the robustness of the attack,
but also increasing the distance: D(X ∗) = 21.78. The sample
at this point (denoted as final in Figure 7b) corresponds to
the output of the attack, since at the iteration 16 the distance
falls above the threshold (DMAX ).
(II) After 11 iterations (denoted as final in Figure 7c), the sample
(in Figure 8d) is classified as a three with a probability equal
to 50.32%, while the one associated to the five is dropped
to 49.45%. The distance D(X ∗) is equal to 21.19. Since at
the iteration 12 the distance is already higher than DMAX ,
we show in Figure 8c the sample at the 10th , whose output
probabilities are denoted as intermediate in Figure 7c and
D(X ∗) = 16.29.
In summary, having a small search window leads to obtaining a
more robust attack, as compared to larger search windows.
5.3 SDBN Under Attack
The baseline SDBN, without attack, classifies our test sample
as a five with a probability equal to 82.69%. The complete set of
output probabilities is shown in Figure 9. We select the three as
the target class. In contrast to the attack applied to the DNN, we
observe, for the case I, that:
• The set of the SDBN output probabilities does not change
monotonically when increasing the iterations of our algo-
rithm.
• At the 20th iteration, the SDBN still classifies the target class
with a probability of 31.08%, while D(X ∗) = 7.79.
• At the other iterations, before and after iteration 20, the
output probability of classifying the image as a five still
dominates.
Meanwhile, for the case II, we observe that:
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 7: Output probabilities, in percentage format, of the DNN for
the crafted sample. (a) Original sample, before applying the attack.
(b) Attack using the search window of case I. (c) Attack using the
search window of case II.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 8: Adversarial samples applied to the DNN. (a) 14th iteration
of case I. (b) 15th iteration of case I. (c) 10th iteration of case II. (d)
11th iteration of case II.
Figure 9: Output probabilities of the SDBN for the original sample
• At the 9th iteration, the SDBN misclassifies the image: the
probability of classifying a three is 50.60%, with a distance
D(X ∗) = 10.91. As a side note, the probability of classifying
a eight is 49.40%.
• At the other iterations, before and after the iteration 7, the
output probability of classifying the image is higher than
50%.
5.4 Comparison
We can observe how DNNs are vulnerable to the attacks gen-
erated by our algorithm, while the SDBN shows a very particular
behavior. They do not follow the expected trend, but may sporadi-
cally lead to a misclassification if also other conditions (that we did
not consider in our model analysis) are satisfied. Each pixel of the
image is converted as a spike train, thus a slight modification of the
pixel intensity can have unexpected consequences. The SNN sensi-
tivity of the targeted attack is clearly different from the respective
DNN sensitivity. Such difference of robustness should be studied
more carefully in future researches.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have not answered the fundamental questions
that we raised. The SNN vulnerability/robustness to adversarial
attacks still needs to be investigated further. However, we opened
new research questions that need to be addressed in the future
work. What is hidden inside the SNNs that make them more robust
to targeted attacks, as compared to DNNs? Are their computational
similarities to the human brain the mean towards robust machine
learning? Thus, extensive in-depth studies of SNNs may bear the
potential to adopt ML-based solutions even in safety-critical appli-
cations.
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